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Abstract—In Part II of this two-part paper, we analyze the
marginal prices derived in Part I of this two-part paper within
a robust optimization framework. The load and generation are
priced at Locational Marginal Price (LMP) while the uncertainty
and generation reserve are priced at Uncertainty Marginal Price
(UMP). The Financial Transmission Right (FTR) underfunding is
demonstrated when there is transmission reserve. A comparison
between traditional reserve price and UMP is presented. We also
discuss the incentives for market participants within the new
market scheme.
Index Terms—Uncertainties, Marginal Price, Robust SCUC,
Financial Transmission Right, Generation Reserve, Transmission
Reserve, FTR Underfunding
I. INTRODUCTION
IN Part I of this two-part paper, the theory for marketclearing is presented [1]. The case studies are reported in
Part II of this two-part paper. Two systems are simulated in
this paper. The first one is a 6-bus system, and the second one
is the IEEE 118-bus system. For the 6-bus system, the basic
ideas of UMP are presented within the robust optimization
framework. We show how to use the UMPs in the new
scheme to clear the market in Section II-A. A comparison
between the UMP and traditional reserve price is made in
Section II-B without transmission constraint. By dropping the
most challenging transmission constraint, the robustness of
the traditional reserve scheme can also be guaranteed. Thus,
we can compare the new scheme and the traditional scheme
fairly. In Section II-C, the sensitivity analysis regarding UMP
is performed. We study the impacts of different uncertainty
levels, ramping rates, generation capacities, and energy bids
on UMPs. In Section II-D, the FTR underfunding issue is pre-
sented within the robust optimization framework. For the IEEE
118-Bus system, the UMPs related products are presented for
different uncertainty levels in Section III-A. We also analyze
the behaviors and impacts of flexible sources using an energy
storage example in Section III-B.
II. 6-BUS SYSTEM
A 6-bus system is studied in this section. The one-line
diagram is shown in Fig.1. The unit data and line data
are shown in Table I and Table II, respectively. Table III
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Fig. 1. One-line Diagram for 6-bus system
TABLE I
UNIT DATA FOR THE 6-BUS SYSTEM
# Pmin Pmax P0 a b c Ru Rd Cu Cd T on T off T0
1 100 220 120 0.004 13.5 176.9 24 24 180 50 4 4 4
2 10 100 50 0.001 32.6 129.9 12 12 360 40 3 2 3
6 10 20 0 0.005 17.6 137.4 5 5 60 0 1 1 −2
Pmin,Pmax,P0 : min/max/initial generation level (MW); fuel cost ($): aP
2 + bP + c ;
Ru ,Rd : ramping up/down rate (MW/h); Cu ,Cd : startup/shutdown cost ($); T
on,T off ,T0 : min on/min
off/initial time (h)
TABLE II
LINE DATA FOR THE 6-BUS SYSTEM
from 1 1 2 5 3 2 4
to 2 4 4 6 6 3 5
x(p.u.) 0.17 0.258 0.197 0.14 0.018 0.037 0.037
capacity(MW) 200 100 100 100 100 200 200
presents the load and uncertainty information. Column “Base
Load” shows the hourly forecasted load. Assume that the load
distributions are 20%, 40%, and 40% for Bus 3, Bus 4, and
Bus 5, respectively. u¯1,t and u¯3,t in Table III are the bounds
of the uncertainties at Bus 1 and Bus 3, respectively. The
uncertainty bounds at other buses are 0. It is assumed that the
relative forecasting errors increase with hours. Uncertainty 1,t
and 3,t also respect
−Λ · u¯m,t ≤ m,t ≤ Λ · u¯m,t,∀t,m (1a)∑
m
|m,t|
u¯m,t
≤ Λ∆,∀t, (1b)
where (1a) denotes the uncertainty interval at a single bus,
and (1b) represents the system-wide uncertainty [2], [3]. The
Λ and Λ∆ are the budget parameters for the single bus and
system, respectively.
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2TABLE III
LOAD AND UNCERTAINTY DATA FOR THE 6-BUS SYSTEM (MW)
Time (h) Base Load u¯1,t u¯3,t Time (h) Base Load u¯1,t u¯3,t
1 175.19 1.09 0.29 13 242.18 19.68 5.25
2 165.15 2.06 0.55 14 243.6 21.32 5.68
3 158.67 2.98 0.79 15 248.86 23.33 6.22
4 154.73 3.87 1.03 16 255.79 25.58 6.82
5 155.06 4.85 1.29 17 256 27.2 7.25
6 160.48 6.02 1.6 18 246.74 27.76 7.4
7 173.39 7.59 2.02 19 245.97 29.21 7.79
8 177.6 8.88 2.37 20 237.35 29.67 7.91
9 186.81 10.51 2.8 21 237.31 31.15 8.31
10 206.96 12.94 3.45 22 232.67 31.99 8.53
11 228.61 15.72 4.19 23 195.93 28.16 7.51
12 236.1 17.71 4.72 24 195.6 29.34 7.82
TABLE IV
MARGINAL COSTS AT DIFFERENT GENERATION LEVELS ($/MWH)
Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3
¯
Pw1 P¯
w
1 mar. cost ¯
Pw2 P¯
w
2 mar. cost ¯
Pw3 P¯
w
3 mar. cost
100 124 14.396 10 28 32.638 10 12 17.71
124 148 14.588 28 46 32.674 12 14 17.73
148 172 14.78 46 64 32.71 14 16 17.75
172 196 14.972 64 82 32.746 16 18 17.77
196 220 15.164 82 100 32.782 18 20 17.79
A. LMP and UMP
In this subsection, we show how to obtain the marginal
prices for energy, uncertainty, and generation reserve ac-
cording to Eqs. (11) and (14) in [1]. The payments and
credits based on these prices are also calculated for market
participants.
Consider the case where Λ = 1,Λ∆ = 2. The CG based
approach converges after 2 iterations. Hence, K = {1, 2}.
The UC results are shown in Fig. 2. The ON/OFF statuses
of G1, G2, and G3 are denoted by black, blue, and red
dots, respectively. It can be observed that the cheaper unit
G1 is always on, G2 is off from Hour 5 to Hour 10, and
G3 is off from Hour 1 to Hour 9. Given the UC solutions,
the problem (RSCED) in [1] can be solved by commercial
linear programming (LP) solver. The marginal prices are then
obtained as byproducts.
The generation outputs are presented in Table V at Hours
21 and 22. It can be observed that G1 supplies most of the
loads at Hour 21, which is 195.19 MW. According to the bid
information in Table IV, G2 is much more expensive than
G1 and G3. Hence, the output of G2 is relatively small and
at the low level of its capacity. The upward and downward
generation reserves provided by the three units are also listed
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Fig. 2. Unit Commitment Results (Λ = 1,Λ∆ = 2)
TABLE V
GENERATION OUTPUT AND RESERVE (Λ = 1,Λ∆ = 2, MW)
T P1 P2 P3 Q
up
1 Q
down
1 Q
up
2 Q
down
2 Q
up
3 Q
down
3
21 195.19 25.58 16.54 24 −24 12 −12 3.46 −5
22 188.26 28.93 15.48 24 −24 12 −12 4.52 −5
TABLE VI
EXTREME POINTS OF UNCERTAINTY SET
k = 1 k = 2
t ˆ11,t ˆ
1
3,t pi
u,1
1,t pi
u,1
3,t ˆ
2
1,t ˆ
2
3,t pi
u,2
1,t pi
u,2
3,t
21 31.15 8.31 14.87 14.87 −31.15 8.31 −17.67 1.77
22 −31.99 −8.53 0 0 31.99 8.53 29.81 29.81
in Table V. These data can be obtained directly from Eqs.
(18) and (19) given the generation output Pi,t. The maximum
upward reserve is 24MW provided by G1, and the minimum
one is 3.46 MW provided by G3. Although the remaining
generation capacity of G1 is 220− 195.19 = 24.62 MW, the
upward reserve is limited by its upward ramping rate 24 MW.
In the meantime, the upward reserve provided by G3 is limited
by its generation capacity although it has more remaining
ramping capacity (i.e. min{20− 16.54, 5} = 3.46 MW).
Table VI shows the extreme points obtained in the CG-based
approach. The intermediate price signals for these points piu,km,t
are also presented. It can be observed that the worst point is
always obtained at the extreme point of the uncertainty set. For
example, at Hour 21, the ˆ11,1 is 31.15 MW. It is exactly the
upper bound of the uncertainty at Hour 21 at Bus 1. The data
in Table VI also verifies Lemma 1. The intermediate UMPs
piu,km,t have the same sign as the uncertainties ˆ
k
m,t at the same
bus. At t = 22, k = 1, the uncertainties are negative while
piu,11,22 = pi
u,1
3,22 = 0.
The LMPs, aggregated upward UMPs, and aggregated
downward UMPs are shown in Table VII, Table VIII, and
Table IX, respectively. It is noted that UMPs still exist at buses
without uncertainties (i.e., Buses 2,4,5,6). This is similar to
LMPs, which also exist at buses where net power injections
are 0. As shown in Table VII, the LMPs vary with locations at
Hour 21. It indicates that the line congestion exists at Hour 21.
The load at Bus 4 has to pay the highest LMP $43.71/MWh.
The UMPs at Hour 21 are also different at various locations.
The highest upward UMP at Hour 21 is also located at Bus
4. As shown in Table IX, the downward UMPs are zeros
except the one at Bus 1 at Hour 21. With these prices, the
market participants can be paid and credited. For example,
G1 supplies 195.19 MWh load at $14.97/MWh at Hour 21.
Then the energy payment to G1 is
195.19MWh× $14.97/MWh = $2922.99.
At the same time, G1 also provides the 24 MW upward
generation reserve and the -24 MW downward generation
reserve. Hence, the generation reserve credit entitled to G1
is
24MW×$14.87/MW+(−24)MW×$(−17.67)/MW = $780.96,
3TABLE VII
LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICE (Λ = 1,Λ∆ = 2,$/MWH)
t Bus1 Bus2 Bus3 Bus4 Bus5 Bus6
21 14.97 32.64 34.4 43.71 41.94 35.26
22 47.56 47.56 47.56 47.56 47.56 47.56
TABLE VIII
UPWARD UMP (Λ = 1,Λ∆ = 2,$/MW)
t Bus1 Bus2 Bus3 Bus4 Bus5 Bus6
21 14.87 14.87 16.63 25.94 24.17 17.49
22 29.81 29.81 29.81 29.81 29.81 29.81
TABLE IX
DOWNWARD UMP (Λ = 1,Λ∆ = 2,$/MW)
t Bus1 Bus2 Bus3 Bus4 Bus5 Bus6
21 −17.67 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0
where the negative sign of UMP means it is downward price,
and the downward generation reserve is also negative. Hence,
the credit is positive. The load located at Bus 3 is charged
47.464MWh× $34.4/MWh = $1632
for energy. The uncertainty source at Bus 3 is charged
8.31MW× $16.63/MW = $138.19.
The LMPs and UMPs also vary with the time intervals. It
is observed that the LMPs at different buses are the same at
Hour 22, which means that there is no line congestion. The
downward UMPs at Hour 22 are zeros for all buses, and the
upward UMPs are $29.81/MW.
Next, we analyze if the generators are inclined to deviate
from the dispatch instructions given the LMP and UMP sig-
nals. At Hour 21, the LMPs are the same as the marginal costs
of G1 and G2 according to the data in Table VII and Table IV.
It means that both G1 and G2 cannot get more profits on
energy by increasing or decreasing the outputs. The reserves
provided by G1 and G2 are limited by their physical ramping
rates. Hence, they can do nothing to increase the generation
reserve payments. On the other hand, the marginal cost for G3
is $17.77/MWh when the output is 16.54 ∈ [16, 18]. The LMP
paid to G3 is $35.26/MWh on Bus 6, which is $17.49/MWh
larger than its marginal cost. It seems that if G3 provides more
power, then it would get more profits on energy. However,
increasing its output also results in lower upward generation
reserve according to Eq. (18) in [1]. The upward UMP is
$17.49/MW on Bus 6, which is exactly the difference between
the LMP and G3’s marginal cost. In other words, G3 cannot
get more profits by deviating from the dispatch instruction.
Hence, the UMP on Bus 6 is also the opportunity cost for
G3 [4]. The analysis here also verifies the competitive market
equilibrium shown in Section III-D of the companion paper.
In fact, the UMPs provide important price signals on
the planning of renewable energy sources and storages. For
example, according to the above analysis, the UMP at Bus
2 is relatively small. It is an ideal location for renewable
energy sources in terms of payment for uncertainties. On the
other hand, the UMP at Bus 4 is large, which may attract
the long-term investment for storages or generation plants
with large ramping rates because they can get more profits
by providing generation reserves. As the UMPs are derived
from the Lagrangian function, these planning activities also
lower the total operation cost and increase the social welfare.
B. Comparison between Existing LMPs and Reserve Prices
The motivation of this subsection is to compare the proposed
clearing scheme with the existing one. However, as the reserve
is not robust in the traditional scheme, we cannot compare
them fairly. With the observation that the transmission con-
straints are the most challenging one in the robust SCUC
framework, we drop these constraints in this subsection. Doing
so is equivalent to assuming that transmission line limits
are large enough so that no line flow constraint is binding.
By relaxing the transmission constraints, the robustness of
the tranditional UC solution can be guranteed by adding the
following spinning reserve constraints
Ii,tP
min
i ≤ Qdowni,t + Pi,t, Qupi,t + Pi,t ≤ Ii,tPmaxi ,∀i, t(2a)
−Rdi Ii,t∆T ≤ Qdowni,t , Qupi,t ≤ Rui Ii,t∆T, ∀i, t (2b)∑
i
Qdowni,t ≤ ¯Rt,
∑
i
Qupi,t ≥ R¯t,∀t, (2c)
where Qupi,t and Q
down
i,t is the largest upward and downward
reserve, respectively.
¯
Rt and R¯t are system wide reserve
requirement. Refer to [5], [6] for more details on the reserve
formulations. In this paper, ∆T is set to 1. The reserve
requirements
¯
Rt and R¯t are set to the system-wide lower
bound and upper bound uncertainty in (1b), respectively. By
adding the above (2a-2c) to (1a-3c) in [1], we can form a
new problem, whose solution is immunized against all the
uncertainties and the same as the solution to RSCUC without
transmission constraints. Therefore, we are able to compare
the proposed pricing mechanism with the traditional one.
Consider the case where Λ = 0.8,Λ∆ = 2. The generation
schedules obtained from RSCUC and traditional SCUC are
presented in Table X. The optimal solutions to the two
models are the same. It verifies the analysis shown in the first
paragraph in this subsection. It indicates that when the upper
bound and lower bound of the system-wide uncertainty are
available, the UC and generation schedules are robust against
uncertainties in the traditional SCUC by setting the reserve
requirement. Consider Hour 21, when the upper bound of the
system-wide uncertainty is
(31.15 + 8.31)× 0.8 = 31.57MW.
At the same Hour 21, the upward generation reserve provided
by the three units are
14.57 + 12 + 5 = 31.57MW.
Therefore, the uncertainties can be accommodated by these
reserves in the upward direction. Similar conclusion can be
verified in the downward direction.
4TABLE X
GENERATION OUTPUT AND RESERVE W/O T.C. (MW)
T P1 P2 P3 Q
up
1 Q
down
1 Q
up
2 Q
down
2 Q
up
3 Q
down
3
21 205.432 16.878 15 14.568 −24 12 −6.878 5 −5
22 204.254 18.416 10 15.746 −24 12 −8.416 5 0
TABLE XI
MARGINAL PRICES AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS W/O T.C.
t LMP UMP/Res.P pio,up1,t pi
o,down
1,t pi
o,up
2,t pi
o,down
2,t pi
o,up
3,t pi
o,down
3,t
21 32.638 17.474 17.474 0 0 0 0 0
22 15.164 −17.474 0 0 0 −17.474 0 −17.474
Table XI presents the LMPs and UMPs in the case without
transmission constraints. The LMPs obtained from the new
scheme and the traditional one are the same. The UMPs
are also the same as the reserve prices obtained from the
traditional approach, which are the Lagrangian multipliers for
(2c) in the simplified model [6], [7]. As the transmission
constraints are dropped, the marginal prices do not change
with the locations, and there is a unique system-wide LMP and
UMP at each interval. It is noted that the downward UMP at
Hour 21 is zero, and the upward UMP at Hour 22 is zero.
In Table XI, only non-zero UMPs are listed. Consider the
payment and credit related to uncertainties at Hours 21 and
22. The three units get the same payment based on the two
schemes,
G1: 14.57× 17.47 + (−24×−17.47) = $673.94
G2: 12× 17.47 + (−8.42×−17.47) = $356.75
G3: 5× 17.47 + 0 = $87.37.
In the clearing scheme proposed in this paper, the uncertainty
source at Bus 1 pays
17.47× 31.15× 0.8 + (−17.47)× (−31.99)× 0.8 = $882.65
The uncertainty source at Bus 3 pays
17.47× 8.31× 0.8 + (−17.47)× (−8.53)× 0.8 = $235.36
It can be observed that the total reserve credit $1118 =
673.94 + 356.75 + 87.37 actually originates from the uncer-
tainty payment $1118 = 882.65 + 235.36. However, in the
traditional scheme, the reserve cost is allocated to the load
serving entity [7]. In means that L2 and L3, which are located
at buses 4 and 5, respectively, pay $447.24 = 1118.1 × 0.4
less at Hour 21 in the new scheme than in the traditional one.
Another observation is that the UMPs in Table XI are
determined by the largest opportunity costs of generators. In
this case, the upward and downward opportunity costs for
generators are calculated as
pio,upi,t :=
∑
k∈Kupm,t
β¯ki,t, pi
o,down
i,t :=
∑
k∈Kdownm,t
¯
βki,t.
At Hour 21, the opportunity costs of G2 and G3 are zeros.
It can also be verified by comparing the LMP and the marginal
fuel costs. For example, generation schedule of G2 is 16.878
TABLE XII
OPERATION COST W.R.T. UNCERTAINTY LEVEL ($)
Λ∆ Λ Cost
2 1 89,851
2 0.8 88,663
2 0.5 87,975
1 1 89,196
1 0.8 88,000
1 0.5 87,975
0 0 87,975
TABLE XIII
LMP W.R.T. UNCERTAINTY LEVEL (t = 21,$/MWH)
Λ∆ Λ Bus1 Bus2 Bus3 Bus4 Bus5 Bus6
2 1 14.972 32.638 34.404 43.709 41.943 35.263
2 0.8 15.164 32.638 34.384 43.589 41.842 35.234
2 0.5 15.164 32.638 34.384 43.589 41.842 35.234
1 1 15.164 32.638 34.384 43.589 41.842 35.234
1 0.8 15.164 32.638 34.384 43.589 41.842 35.234
1 0.5 15.164 32.638 34.384 43.589 41.842 35.234
MW at Hour 21, and the LMP is $32.638/MWh, which is the
same as the marginal cost. In the meantime, the opportunity
cost of G1 is $17.474/MW, which is also the UMP. At Hour 22,
the downward UMP is $17.474/MW, which is the opportunity
cost of G2 or G3.
When considering transmission constraints, the generation
reserve cannot be guaranteed at bus levels in the traditional
SCUC model. The marginal prices are different in the two
schemes.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we perform the sensitivity analysis of
UMPs with respect to the uncertainty levels, unit capacities
and ramping rates, and energy bids. The bus-level uncertainty
level is defined by Λ, and the system uncertainty level is de-
fined by the budget parameter Λ∆. We have Λ ∈ {0.5, 0.8, 1}
and Λ∆ ∈ {1, 2}.
The total operation costs are presented in Table XII. It can
be observed that when Λ∆ is fixed, the cost is a monotonically
non-decreasing function of Λ. For example, the cost is $88,663
if Λ∆ = 2 and Λ = 0.8. The cost is increased to $89,851
if Λ is changed to 1. When Λ is fixed, the cost is also a
monotonically non-decreasing function of Λ∆. The cost in the
case of Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 0.8 is $663 higher than that in the case
of Λ∆ = 1,Λ = 0.8. We can draw the conclusion that the
operation cost for the base case may increase with the uncer-
tainty level. A special case is simulated with Λ∆ = 0,Λ = 0.
It can be observed that the total operation cost is $87,975,
which is the same as that in the case of Λ∆ = 1,Λ = 0.5
and Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 0.5. It indicates that even if we ignore
the uncertainties in the SCUC and SCED problems, certain
level of robustness is still kept in the optimal solution as
generation reserves are already available at individual buses.
If the uncertainty level is below Λ = 0.5 at each bus, no
additional cost is needed to immunize the system against the
uncertainties. LMPs with respect to different uncertainty levels
5TABLE XIV
GENERATION OUTPUT AND RESERVE W.R.T UNCERTAINTY LEVEL
(t = 21,MW)
Λ∆ Λ P1 P2 P3 Q
up
1 Q
up
2 Q
up
3 Q
down
1 Q
down
2 Q
down
3
2 1 195.193 25.577 16.54 24 12 3.46 −24 −12 −5
2 0.8 201.589 20.721 15 18.411 12 5 −24 −10.721 −5
2 0.5 203.173 14.137 20 16.827 12 0 −24 −4.137 −5
1 1 196.023 21.287 20 23.977 12 0 −24 −11.287 −5
1 0.8 202.253 15.057 20 17.747 12 0 −24 −5.057 −5
1 0.5 203.173 14.137 20 16.827 12 0 −24 −4.137 −5
TABLE XV
UPWARD UMP W.R.T. UNCERTAINTY LEVEL (t = 21, $/MW)
Λ∆ Λ Bus1 Bus2 Bus3 Bus4 Bus5 Bus6
2 1 14.868 14.868 16.634 25.939 24.173 17.493
2 0.8 0 0 1.746 10.951 9.204 2.596
2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1.746 10.951 9.204 2.596
1 0.8 0 0 1.746 10.951 9.204 2.596
1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
are presented in Table XIII. It can be observed that the LMPs
also vary with different uncertainties. For example, all the
LMPs from Bus 3 to Bus 6 increase with the increment of Λ,
but LMP at Bus 1 decreases. It indicates that the uncertainty
level is also reflected in the LMPs.
The optimal generation schedules are presented in Ta-
ble XIV. With Λ∆ = 2, the generation output of G1 increases
from 195.193 to 201.59 MW when Λ decreases from 1 to
0.8, while the outputs of G2 and G3 both decrease. As the
fuel cost of G1 is lower, the total operation cost is reduced,
which is consistent with the data in Table XII. On the other
hand, the upward generation reserve (i.e. Qup1 ) provided by
G1 is reduced by 24-18.411 = 5.599 MW. Similar results can
also be observed when the budget parameter Λ∆ and Λ are
at other values. Another observation is that if Λ = 0.5, the
generation schedules remain the same when changing Λ∆.
This is also consistent with the total operation cost data shown
in Table XII. The generation reserves are the byproducts of the
optimal solution to SCED problem.
The upward and downward UMPs are shown in Table XV
and Table XVI, respectively. The UMPs are zeros with Λ =
0.5. It indicates that the small perturbation of the uncertainty
at Bus 1 and Bus 3 does not change the total operation cost
for the base case. In this case, although both the upward
and downward generation reserves are available according to
Table XIV, units do not get any credit. In the meantime, the
TABLE XVI
DOWNWARD UMP W.R.T. UNCERTAINTY LEVEL (t = 21,$/MW)
Λ∆ Λ Bus1 Bus2 Bus3 Bus4 Bus5 Bus6
2 1 −17.666 0 0 0 0 0
2 0.8 −17.474 0 0 0 0 0
2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 −17.474 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.8 −17.474 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE XVII
UMP SETTLEMENT W.R.T. UNCERTAINTY LEVEL (t = 21,$)
Λ∆ Λ ΘG1,t Θ
G
2,t Θ
G
3,t Ψ1,t Ψ3,t Revenue
2 1 780.82 178.42 60.52 1,013.43 138.23 131.9
2 0.8 419.38 0 12.98 435.45 11.61 14.71
2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 419.38 0 0 544.32 14.51 139.45
1 0.8 419.38 0 0 435.45 11.61 27.69
1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
uncertainty sources also do not need to pay. Those generation
reserves are “free” byproducts of the SCED solution. As
shown in Table XV, by fixing Λ∆ = 2, the UMPs increase
with the increment of the uncertainty level Λ at Hour 21.
For example, the upward UMP is 0 at Bus 1 with Λ = 0.8.
By changing Λ to 1, the upward UMP at Bus 1 increases
to $14.868/MW. It is also observed that UMPs vary with
locations. As shown in Table XVI, the downward UMPs at Bus
1 are non-zero, which indicates that the downward generation
reserves at Bus 1 are scarce resources; the downward UMPs
at other buses are zeros, which indicates that the downward
generation reserves at those buses are not scarce resources.
The sensitivity data in these tables show that the uncertainties
are only charged when the uncertainty level is above a certain
threshold. Accordingly, the flexible resources are also entitled
to credits for the uncertainty management.
The market settlement related to uncertainties are shown in
Table XVII. The payment to a generator is denoted as ΘGi,t, and
the charge to an uncertainty source is denoted as Ψm,t. They
are calculated based on Eqs. (21) and (16) [1], respectively.
For example, the payment to G1 is
ΘG1,21 = 14.868× 24 + (−17.666)× (−24) = $780.82
with Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 1. $14.868/MW and $-17.666/MW are
the upward and downward UMPs, respectively. 24 MW and
-24 MW are the upward and downward generation reserves,
respectively.
One observation from Table XVII is that G3 gets more
reserve credit in the case of Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 1 than Λ∆ =
2,Λ = 0.8, although it has smaller generation reserves in the
first case. The reason is that the upward UMP at Bus 6 soars to
$17.493/MWh from $2.596/MWh when Λ is increased from
0.8 to 1. The charge to the uncertainty source at Bus 3 is
calculated as
Ψ3,21 = 16.634× 8.31 + 0× (−8.31) = $138.23,
where $16.634/MW is the upward UMP and 8.31MW is the
upper bound of the uncertainty.
Another observation from Table XVII is that the total money
uncertainty sources pay decreases with the uncertainty level
Λ. For example, when Λ∆ = 2, the payment of uncertainty
source at Bus 1 is $1013.43 at Hour 21 with u¯1,21 = 31.15MW
and u¯3,21 = 8.31MW. If the uncertainty sources reduce the
uncertainties u¯1,21 and u¯3,21 to 31.15 × 0.8 = 24.92MW
and 8.31 × 0.8 = 6.648MW, respectively, then the payment
from uncertainty source at Bus 1 decreases from $577.98 to
$435.45, and the uncertainty source at Bus 3 also pay $126.62
6TABLE XVIII
G3 WITH MODIFIED CAPACITY AND RAMPING (t = 21,
Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 0.8)
P3,t Q
up
3 Q
down
3 pi
e
6 pi
u,up
6 pi
u,down
6
15 5.5 -5 35.2341 2.5961 0
TABLE XIX
LMP AND UMP WITH MODIFIED ENERGY BID
(Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 0.8, t = 21, $/MWH)
Bus1 Bus2 Bus3 Bus4 Bus5 Bus6
pie6,21 15.1640 30.6380 32.1846 40.3353 38.7887 32.9369
pi
u,up
6,21 0.0000 0.0000 1.5466 9.6973 8.1507 2.2989
piu,down6,21 -15.4740 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
less. It indicates that uncertainty sources have the incentives
to reduce the uncertainties.
Next, we check whether the generators have the incentives
to increase the ramping rates and generation capacities. As-
sume that the capacity of G2 is increased to 20.5 MW from
20MW, and the upward ramping is increased to 5.5MW/h from
5MW/h. The optimal schedules and marginal prices are listed
in Table XVIII when Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 0.8. The new credit for
managing uncertainty is
5.5× 2.5961 = $14.28,
which is larger than the original credit of $12.98. Therefore,
G2 is entitled to more generation reserve and credit by
increasing its flexibility. However, it also should be pointed
out that the market participants are assumed as price takers in
this paper [8]–[10]. If the changes of the flexibilities are large
enough to change the UMPs, then the market participants may
be able to manipulate the market.
In this section, generators only submit the energy bids (i.e.
step-wise fuel costs shown in Table IV), and the generation
reserve bids are assumed to be zeros. It is also consistent
with what is available in the literature [6]. In this paragraph,
we demonstrate the impacts of energy bid changes on UMP.
Consider the case where Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 0.8. The bidding
prices of G2 in all segments are reduced by $2/MWh to
$30.638/MWh, $30.674/MWh, $30.71/MWh, $30.746/MWh,
and $30.782/MWh, respectively, while the bids of other units
remain the same. Accordingly, we get another set of price
signals after solving the problem (RSCUC). At Hour 21,
the generation outputs remain the same. But both LMPs and
UMPs are changed as shown in Table XIX. By comparing
the LMPs in Table XIX and Table XIII, we observe that
the energy prices for all the buses are lower when marginal
prices of G2 are reduced. The UMPs also show the same
trends by comparing the UMPs in Table XIX, Table XV, and
Table XVI. For example, the upward UMP at Bus 4 is reduced
to $9.6973/MW from $10.951/MW, the upward UMP at Bus
6 is also reduced by $0.298/MW, and the downward UMP at
Bus 1 decreases to $15.474/MW from $17.474/MW. It can
be observed that the highest UMP has the largest change in
this case. Similar to the discussion in the above paragraph,
the trends may be altered if the participants have enough
market power. The analysis on Nash-equilibrium would be an
interesting future research.
D. FTR Underfunding
When Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 1, the generation schedules at Hour
21 are presented in Table XIV. The power flow of Line 2 is
97.63MW, which is smaller than its physical limit of 100MW.
The fact that LMPs are different at different locations indicates
that the congestion components in LMPs are non-zero. This is
different from the traditional practice that congestion compo-
nents exist only when certain power flows reach their limits.
This is because the transmission reserve 100MW - 97.63MW
= 2.47MW is kept to guarantee the delivery of the generation
reserve. At least one of the transmission constraints (9f) for
Line 2 is binding in problem (RSCED) of the companion paper
[1], and at least one of their Lagrangian multipliers is positive.
The positive Lagrangian multiplier leads to the congestion
component of LMPs.
As stated in Section III-C in [1], the LMPs obtained accord-
ing to its definition in the robust optimization framework may
lead to FTR underfunding. Consider a set of FTR amounts
[202.3429, 23.2771,−55.772,−94.924,−94.924, 20]. It can
be verified that the FTR amounts satisfy the SFT in the FTR
market. Then the total credit for the FTR holders is
100MW× $55.5477/MW = $5, 554.77,
where $55.5477/MW is the sum of shadow prices for the
line constraints, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1 in [1].
However, the congestion fee in the DAM is
97.6254MW× $55.5477/MW = $5, 422.87.
It means that the congestion payment collected from DAM is
not enough to cover the FTR credit. The FTR underfunding
value is
$5554.77− $5422.87 = $131.90.
Therefore, the FTR underfunding may occur in this scenario
if the existing market mechanism is used. This example shows
that the robust solution may lead to FTR underfunding in the
traditional market framework.
Now we consider the revenue residue after the UMP set-
tlement in the market. The revenue residues are shown in the
last column in Table XVII. When Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 1, the revenue
residue is $131.9, which is obtained as
(1013.43 + 138.23)− (780.82 + 178.42 + 60.52) = $131.9.
It can be observed that the FTR underfunding can be covered
by the revenue residue exactly in this scenario. Therefore, the
revenue is adequate at Hour 21.
As the UMPs vary with locations, there are congestion
components when Λ = 1 and Λ = 0.5. According to the
data in Table XVII, the revenue residues in these cases are
also non-zero. This verifies Eqs. (12) and (23). The fact that
the UMPs vary with locations indicates that at least one of the
shadow prices ηkl,t for line constraints is positive according to
(12). The positive ηkl,t must lead to the transmission reserve
credit from (23). In other words, the revenue residue related
7TABLE XX
OPERATION COST AND PAYMENT RELATED TO UMP ($,Λ∆ = 10)
Λ Op. Cost Un. Payment Gen. Res. Credit Rev. Res.
0.2 1,866,023 11,043 10,560 483
0.25 1,871,364 20,044 19,209 835
0.3 1,877,471 30,879 28,658 2,221
to uncertainties must be positive. The revenue residue is then
distributed to the FTR holders. Note that if and only if
UMPs vary with locations, the revenue residue related to
uncertainties is positive.
III. IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM
The simulations are performed for the IEEE 118-bus system
with 54 thermal units and 186 branches in this section. The
peak load is 6600MW. The detailed data including generator
parameters, line reactance and ratings, and load profiles can be
found at http://motor.ece.iit.edu/Data/RSCUC 118 UMP.xls.
Two cases are studied in this section.
1) The uncertainty levels and load levels are changed to
analyze the simulation results in the system level.
2) An energy storage is installed at a specified bus with
high UMP to show the potential application of UMPs.
A. Case 1
We assume that the uncertainty sources are located at buses
(11, 15, 49, 54, 56, 59, 60, 62, 80, 90). The budget parameter
Λ∆ is set to 10 in this section. The bus-level uncertainty
budget parameter Λ changes from 0.2 to 0.3, and the bound
of the uncertainty is the base load. The simulation results
are shown in Table XX. It can be observed that the total
operation cost increases with increasing Λ. The largest op-
eration cost is $1,877,471 with Λ = 0.3. It indicates that
a larger uncertainty level may increase the operation cost.
The payments and credits related to UMPs are also listed
in the table. The columns “Un. Payment” and “Gen. Res.
Credit” denote the total payment from uncertainty sources and
credit to generation reserves, respectively. It can be observed
that the uncertainty sources pay less when the uncertainty
level is low. The lowest payment is $11,043 and the highest
one is $30,879. On the other hand, the credit entitled to the
generation reserves is also a monotonically increasing function
of Λ. When Λ = 0.3, the generation reserves have the highest
credit. The last column “Rev. Res.” shows that the revenue
residues related to UMPs. It can be observed that the residue
is always positive. When Λ is large, the residue is also high.
As discussed in Section II-D, the residue exists when there
are line congestions.
Fig. 3 depicts the heat map for the upward UMPs from
Bus 80 to Bus 100 in 24 hours. The x-axis represents time
intervals and the y-axis represents bus numbers. The color bar
on the right shows different colors for various UMP values.
For example, the $0/MW is denoted by the blue color at
the bottom, and the $18/MW is represented by the dark red
color on the top of the color bar. It can be observed that the
uncertainty sources have system-wide unique UMPs at some
 
 
Hour  5 Hour 10 Hour 15 Hour 20
Bus  82
Bus  84
Bus  86
Bus  88
Bus  90
Bus  92
Bus  94
Bus  96
Bus  98
Bus 100
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
18.00
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Fig. 4. Uncertainty Payment (UP), Generation Reserve Credit (GRC), and
Operation Cost (OC) with Different Load Levels (Λ = 0.25)
intervals, such as Hours 8, 13, 15, and so on. It indicates that
there is no transmission reserve in these hours. On the other
hand, the UMPs at Hour 11 vary dramatically with different
locations. The highest upward UMP is around $18/MW, and
the lowest one is around $2/MW. According to the data shown
in Fig. 3, the high UMP at Bus 94 may attract investment
of flexible resources, such as energy storages, in terms of
generation reserve credit, and Bus 100 is an attractive location
for the investment of renewable energy sources in terms of
uncertainty payments.
Fig. 4 shows the uncertainty payment and generation reserve
credit with respect to load levels. The base load level is set
at 100%. Higher loads in general lead to more uncertainty
payments and generation reserve credits. It is also consistent
with the heat map of UMPs in Fig. 3, where UMPs at peak
load hours are high. It suggests that the generation reserves
also become scarce resources when load levels are high.
B. Case 2
As discussed in Case 1, the upward UMP on Bus 94 is high
at Hour 11. Assume that an energy storage (8MW/30MWh)
is installed at Bus 94. A simple model for the energy storage
is formulated as
Et = Et−1 + ρdPDt + ρ
cPCt ,∀t
0 ≤ Et ≤ Emax,∀t
0 ≤ −PDt ≤ IDt RD,∀t
0 ≤ PCt ≤ ICt RC ,∀t
IDt + I
C
t ≤ 1,∀t
ENT = E0,
where Et denotes the energy level, PDt and P
C
t represent
the discharging and charging rates, and IDt and I
C
t are the
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Fig. 5. Heat Map for Upward UMPs with Energy Storage (Λ = 0.3)
indicators of discharging and charging. As the UMP is the
major concern in this section, we use simplified parameters for
storage. The discharging efficiency ρd and charging efficiency
ρc are set to 100%. The capacity Emax and initial energy
level E0 are set to 30 MWh and 15 MWh, respectively. The
maximal charging rate RD and discharging rate RC are set to
8 MW/h.
By introducing the energy storage, the new operation cost
is reduced to $1,875,211 from $1,877,471. The payment col-
lected from the uncertainty sources becomes $27,473, and the
credit to generation reserves decreases to $24,289. Compared
to the data in Table XX, the energy storage also helps to reduce
the payment related to UMPs. The storage is entitled to $1326
generation reserve credit. Fig. 5 depicts the new upward UMPs
after the installation of the energy storage. Compared to that
in Fig. 3, the upward UMP for Hour 11 at Bus 94 decreases a
lot. The UMPs for Hour 10 and 12 are also lower. It suggests
that sitting the energy storage at Bus 94 effectively lower the
generation reserve price.
The simulation results show that the energy storage can
provide additional upward and downward generation reserves.
It is demonstrated that flexible resources can lower the UMPs,
and UMPs provide the investment signal at locations where
generation reserves are scarce resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
The two-part paper propose a new market scheme to charge
the uncertainty sources and credit the generation reserve
providers according to the UMPs in day-ahead electricity
markets. The UMP formulation is derived within a robust
optimization framework. We also characterize the market equi-
librium for the new market mechanism. Our study also shows
that traditional pricing mechanism within RSCUC framework
may lead to FTR underfunding and the payment collected from
uncertainty sources can cover the deficit. Our study shows load
serving entities can have lower energy prices within the new
market scheme, as the reserve fees are paid by uncertainty
sources. It can prevent market participants with uncertainties
from gaming the system to certain extent.
An important future research on this topic is that flexible
resources, such as generators with large generation reserves
and storages, can bid the generation reserves within the
RSCUC framework. The Nash-equilibrium for UMP is also
our ongoing research. The UMPs derived in this paper also
provide an important price signal for the long-term investment
of flexible resources. When the upward UMP or downward
UMP at a bus is high, the investor can get more return in
terms of generation reserves. Many potential applications on
UMPs are open for future research.
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